Abstract
Changing State Behaviour
In March 2018, the Council of Europe published the news that, out of all judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) since its inception
In seeking to address the problem, the emphasis has been on thinking creatively about the choice of remedies that the ECtHR could impose on states that would motivate states to address their human rights violations at home. Social scientists and economists have observed that human behaviour can be changed through three mechanisms of social influence: material inducement, persuasion and acculturation. 6 Material inducement seeks to influence the behaviour of actors by imposing material costs or benefits. The imposition of a fine will motivate the state to conduct a costbenefit analysis as to whether a certain behaviour is economically sound. If the costs of continuous behaviour outweigh the benefits, then the expectation is that the state supposed to provide an efficient and persuasive remedial framework, providing for different incentives for states to comply with European human rights judgments.
Given the poor compliance record of some states and the general 50 per cent failure to execute ECtHR judgments, it is evident that the current structure and functioning of remedies is not working. The exercise of shaming states into compliance is a function for the Committee of Ministers rather than the Court and has been only varyingly successful. In the first global statistical analysis of the issue, Emilie Hafner-Burton found that, while governments' efforts to expose and shame human rights violators often improved protections for political rights after states were publicly criticized (for example, they hold elections), these states rarely ceased or decreased their policies of torture and disappearances. 12 Paradoxically, sometimes, international pressure and disapproval is followed by more repression in the short term, prompting leaders and despots to use more strategies of terror. In a sense, it may be easier for some governments to reform their legal or political structures (for example, by organizing elections or passing legislation to better protect some political rights) than to stop agents of terror that are out of their direct control. Another reason, however, is that some governments abuse human rights strategically; when faced with global pressures for reform, some governments offset the improvements they make in response to international pressure with terror, such as killings or beatings so as to boost their legitimacy at home.
Similarly, non-monetary remedies have proven to be only partially successful. In the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), for example, Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby have shown that, out of 908 discrete actions that the Court has imposed, states have complied with 251 of these (that is, a 28 per cent compliance rate). The rate of compliance decreased the more invasive the remedy was; when states had to issue an apology for their behaviour, the compliance rate was 31 per cent; when states were told to punish perpetrators or restore rights to those who had them taken away, compliance dropped to between 13 and 19 per cent and, finally, when the Court ordered a state to amend, repeal or adopt domestic laws or judgments, this was done in only 5 per cent of cases. All of these examples scarcely compare to compliance with the payment of moral and material damages (47 per cent and 42 per cent respectively). Although no similar study has been undertaken for the ECtHR, which issues non-monetary remedies much more reluctantly than the IACtHR, 13 judges themselves insist that the Court faces the same issue with compliance as its inter-American counterpart. 14 In fact, in the most recent conference of state parties, the issue of repetitive 12 Hafner-Burton, 'Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem', 62 International Organization (IO) (2008) 689. 13 In his article, the current vice president of the Court speaks of about 268 cases in which general measures were awarded. cases arising from the non-execution of pilot judgments imposing such non-monetary remedies was explicitly raised as a problem. 15 In the end, it is to material inducement that experts seem to turn. 16 Article 41 of the ECHR on 'just satisfaction' seems to serve as the ECtHR's go-to remedy, and it represents an opportunity for the Court to provide a material incentive to states to change their behaviour. As the least burdensome and most complied with remedy, it offers the greatest potential for maximizing deterrence and, thus, ensuring remedy efficiency. In this context, scholars argue that a damage award can go beyond the aim of seeking to compensate the claimant for the harm done. The imposition of a high fine would motivate the state to conduct a cost-benefit analysis as to whether a certain behaviour is economically sound. If the costs of continuous behaviour outweighed the benefits, then the expectation is that the state would cease the costly actions. Aggravated damages could incentivize states to cease their recalcitrant behaviour and act to redress repeat violations and structural problems at home. 17 While international law has always made use of the material inducement approach to change state practices (for example, Security Council sanctions or World Bank loans conditional on compliance), the idea of punitive damages has generally been rejected. 18 Neither compensation nor satisfaction is intended 'to punish the responsible State, nor … have an expressive or exemplary character'. 19 In fact, even when a serious breach of an international obligation has occurred, 'the award of punitive damages is not recognized in international law'. Even more, after the International Law Commission made a proposal for 'damages reflecting the gravity of the breach', the overwhelmingly negative reaction led the rapporteur to conclude that 'the idea of punitive damages under international law is currently unsustainable'. 20 The ECtHR explicitly accepts this approach 21 and, until now, has not considered it appropriate to accept claims for damages with labels such as 'punitive', 'aggravated' or 'exemplary ' . 22 already be punishing states for certain types of behaviour. 23 In Cyprus v. Turkey, Pinto de Albuquerque argued in his concurring opinion that the Court has 'awarded punitive damages to the claimant State', 24 and in Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy, the Court more generally stated that Article 41 awards must be 'a serious and effective means of dissuasion with regard to the repetition of unlawful conduct of the same type, without however assuming a punitive function'. 25 The Committee of Ministers has also explicitly supported the use of punitive damages to ensure the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments, as has the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which welcomed the introduction of fines to be imposed on states that persistently fail to execute the judgments of the Court, with a view to introducing more effective measures in the face of non-compliance.
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The proposals for the ECtHR to adopt a more assertive approach to damages and adopt punitive damages are increasingly vocal, even within the Court. 27 With the new mechanisms introduced by Protocol 14 that now permit the Committee of Ministers to bring a member state before the Court for non-compliance with a previous judgment, the argument is that such infringement proceedings now offer an opportunity for the Court to mirror the approach of the European Union (EU) courts. 28 In EU law, deterrence is clearly incorporated into the primary law of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for imposing financial sanctions on member states for non-compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union or the failure to transpose directives. 29 Although no similar (explicit) legal basis exists in Protocol 14, the Court's extensive discretion within Article 41 (or Article 46) would permit it to impose damages as a financial incentive on recalcitrant states to nudge them into compliance. 30 With the first infringement case recently having come before the Court, the opportunity to adopt such an approach is here and now. 31 In this article, I show how the choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated or punitive damages look like an ideal option to nudge states into compliance. I then turn to the most recent proposals arguing for the introduction of aggravated or punitive damages. Based on my empirical research, I show that the current case law presents several obstacles to the introduction of such damages. 32 Building on the 
The Current Compliance Problem and Its Link to Remedies
Traditionally, scholars have insisted that compliance with human rights decisions depends on the type of state and on the participation of citizens in non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this context, democratic states with an active civil society appear to be more likely to comply with human rights norms than autocratic regimes with a weak civil society. 33 Others insist that reputational concerns and social conformity explain patterns of compliance. Governments appear to commit and comply with legal obligations if other countries in the region do so as well. 34 In the European context, for example, Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib speak of Denmark, Finland and Sweden as states that have adopted a 'culture of compliance', while other contrasting geographic areas weigh being compliant with decisions against the domestic political cost of not doing so 35 and post-communist jurisdictions treat law as a 'dead letter'. 36 Still other scholars argue that compliance is closely linked to the overall legal infrastructure capacity and government effectiveness. If the institutional capacity of the country is high (that is, if there are several domestic bodies to check for compliance), this helps willing politicians implement judgments quickly, and 'the adverse judgments are unlikely to be obstructed or ignored, even when the government, political elites, or other actors are reluctant'. 37 In this context, for example, the United Kingdom's (UK) Joint Committee for Human Rights has been hailed as a key institution, holding a 'powerful and central place in the UK's parliamentary system of government' 38 and acting as 'a conduit between the executive, legislature and judiciary on human rights concerns' in order to expedite compliance with the ECHR by 'facilitating the involvement of civil society groups and the media in monitoring compliance and holding the state to account'. 39 Yet, as empirical studies have shown, compliance may not only be affected by variables related to the state but also by the type of remedies adopted by the ECtHR in its judgments. While low capacity countries may appear to take longer to implement decisions, this may not be necessarily because they have less expertise or capacity but, rather, because often they also apparently attract judgments that are more difficult to implement. 40 In this context, Yuval Shany argues that compliance 'may be strongly influenced by the substantive positions endorsed by the judgment in question and the specific type of remedies issued'. 41 He hypothesizes that the less objectionable the substantive portion of the court judgment is (for the losing party), and the less onerous the remedies issued, the greater the judgment's 'compliance pull' is expected to be. 42 Therefore, the more the state agrees with the substance of the judgment and the less effort is required of it to enforce the decision, the more likely the compliance.
This basic insight on compliance is not only supported in the international legal realism literature, which often uses game theoretic models to illustrate the interplay between state interests and compliance, 43 but it also finds support in some initial, small-scale descriptive empirical work, which suggests that 'high-cost' judgments (that is, judgments for which compliance would adversely affect important state interests in a significant manner) are less complied with than 'low-cost' judgments. 44 Hawkins and Jacoby, for example, have found that in many ECtHR cases still pending before the Committee of Ministers, just satisfaction (as the low-cost element of the judgment) was paid quickly after the initial judgment was rendered, but any additional remedies -such as individual measures or general measures -were either not adopted or considerably delayed. 45 In the now infamous Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan case, the ECtHR awarded €20,000 in damages to the victim, a fervent critic of the government who had been arrested and detained without any evidence of having committed the offence with which he was charged. 46 The Court concluded that the actual purpose of his detention had been to silence or punish Mr Mammadov for criticizing the government and publishing the information it was trying to hide. Without any delay, Azerbaijan paid Mammadov the damages in compliance with the judgment, yet for years after the judgment the victim remained in prison despite the condemnations received from the Committee of Ministers and calls for his release.
The observation that states may be distinguishing between different remedies and choosing to comply with only the less onerous parts of the judgment is important since the aim of international courts is not only to trigger action in response to the judgment in relation to the individual appearing before the Court but also to encourage more general convergence or internalization of norms, compelling states to make international norms part of their domestic legal system in such a manner as to make international supervision completely unnecessary. 47 The expectation is therefore that international norms and decisions will get embedded into the domestic laws and will change domestic practices to an extent that prevents violations from occurring and deters potential violators. 48 In this context, however, an international court like the ECtHR, together with the Committee of Ministers, which is seeking to effectuate a change in laws and practices of its member states, faces a dilemma. As Figure 1 shows, '[t]he less onerous the remedies issued by the international court are, the smaller is the potential change in state practice brought about by these remedies and thus the … more "shallow" is the court's impact'. 49 Although compliance with monetary remedies may therefore be high, the impact of a judgment in the state's domestic legal system could be minimal. In fact, 'judicial remedies may fail to impact state practice either because they are rejected by states as utopian -completely divorced from their interests -or apologetic -reflective of practices existing independently of the judgment -and therefore meaningless'.
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Choosing a remedy requires the Court to reflect upon its institutional responsibility and the limits of its competence. An essential part of that role appears to involve an assessment of which measure will be most efficient. 51 In this regard, it has to strategically weigh which remedy is most likely to be implemented and which will have the deepest impact. The Court's preference for damages is clearly visible from Figure 1 , where the size of the circle indicates the number of cases in which compensation versus other non-monetary remedies was awarded. Of course, the Court is aware of the dangers of imposing specific non-monetary remedies with which no state would comply. 52 On occasion, the judgments of the ECtHR have contained some recommendations about individual or general measures that ought to be adopted to fully enforce the judgment in the domestic legal system. In the first pilot judgment issued by the 47 Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process', supra note 7; Goodman and Jinks, supra note 6. 48 However, for the most part, the Court has insisted that it is not its task to determine what non-monetary remedies would appropriately satisfy the obligations under the ECHR. 54 The Court is concerned about over-reaching: on the one hand, specifying non-monetary remedies that might interfere with the state's domestic legal system (for example, '[i]t is not for the Court to prescribe specific procedures for domestic courts to follow') 55 and, on the other hand, choosing the means by which the state should discharge its obligation under the Convention that is mutually determined by the state and the Committee of Ministers. 56 Yet the Committee of Ministers, rather than instructing governments on measures to be taken, equally waits for the state to present its own action plan in which it sets out the strategy for compliance and internalization: 'Discretion therefore prevails even as innovation in legal rules and judicial practice have prompted the Court to partly diverge from it.' 57 The current set up therefore provides states ample freedom to determine for themselves what the remedy should be. Once an adverse ruling is rendered, states must work backwards from the violation to understand what must be changed to remedy it in the specific case and to ensure future cases do not arise. Ministers plays in helping the state choose the means by which it will discharge its obligation. 57 Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi, supra note 37, at 214.
Figure 1: The efficiency diagram
Leaving such extensive discretion to states to determine their own remedies relies on the persuasive power of the ECtHR's ruling. 58 International courts typically have very low enforcement authority, and compliance with their decisions is always voluntary. In this regard, as Shany argues, it is the substance of the judgments and the positions endorsed that will motivate and persuade states to implement changes. 59 For example, some scholars argue that when the ECtHR found that the opinion of an advocate general could not be regarded as neutral under Article 6, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands were nudged into adopting extensive domestic judicial reforms in spite of the historical position of the advocate general in their respective systems. The judgments of the Court had painted a sufficiently persuasive picture of a need for a specific 'judicial design' within which the old role of advocate generals was simply no longer tenable and had to be revamped to make it consistent with the ECHR. 60 In this sense, leaving discretion to states on how to change the position of the advocate general motivated compliance because the legal systems were provided with sufficient 'breathing room' to come up with their own solution. 61 Judicial silence and deference to state on how to enforce and internalize human rights decisions would therefore appear to open up a dialogue between the Court and state and, over time, promote better compliance.
Yet the decision of the ECtHR not to be prescriptive as far as individual and general measures are concerned also may mean that many states take their prerogative by designing remedies that take less than full account of the Court's judgment. 62 This point has long been acknowledged by Court insiders, and, on a number of occasions, the Committee of Ministers has explicitly requested that the Court expressly stipulate the remedy. 63 As Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argue, in international law, 'ambiguity and indeterminacy' of legal language 'lie at the root of much of the behaviour that may seem to violate treaty requirements'. 64 Extensive non-compliance may stem from imprecision in how obligations are framed. If the ECtHR does not specify the actions or remedies required, it is difficult for states to comply and internalize its judgments. If its judgments are meant to persuade states and cajole them into certain behaviour, then they are most useful 'if they sharply reduce uncertainty about the content of obligations'. 65 In this context, compliance and internalization will occur only after states have engaged in an active assessment of the justification for these norms and understood their content. Precision, therefore, promotes compliance and internalization. To a certain extent, this has been shown in the context of the IACtHR, which provides a list of highly specific steps that must be undertaken as remedies to adverse judgments. This checklist often leads to only partial compliance, but the specificity nevertheless helps states with enforcement. 66 The ECtHR is increasingly 'quite concerned with states' inclination and capacity to abide by Court decisions and is now devoting significant resources to 'helping states'. 67 In this context, the Court has agreed in some cases to assist the respondent state by attempting to indicate the type of measures it could take in order to put an end to the systemic situation found in the case. This has occurred especially in cases where the Court has wished to 'facilitate the rapid and effective suppression of a malfunction found in the national system of human rights protection', 68 such as reinstating a judge to the Supreme Court, 69 reducing a prisoner's sentence 70 or even putting in place a mechanism for the enforcement of domestic judgments. 71 These actions have shown varying results. While Judge Oleksandr Volkov was reinstated back to his position as Ukraine's Supreme Court justice on the instructions of the Court in 2015, and Franco Scoppola's sentence was reduced, 72 the pilot decision relating to Ukraine's non-enforcement of thousands of domestic judgments remains unimplemented. 73 In fact, by 2017, the situation in relation to Ukraine had become so frustrating that the Court admitted that its practice was 'incapable of achieving its intended purpose' and that it had come time for the Court to 'redefine … its role'. 74 Referring to the Brighton Declaration, the Court asserted that it only had a 'subsidiary' role to play in the context of execution of its judgments and that it had discharged it fully by specifying the appropriate remedy in the previous (pilot) decision. 75 The Court proceeded to dismiss more than 12,000 cases against the state, insisting that when general remedial measures were ineffective, it was for the Committee of Ministers and the Execution Department, together with state parties, to seek out new measures to motivate state compliance. 76 Since the state could not be persuaded to address the violation domestically, the Court therefore gave up.
When Monetary Remedies Can Provide an Incentive
states' discretion in the implementation of its judgments 77 or due to concerns about non-compliance. 78 Instead, the Court's focus has been on Article 41 -just satisfaction. The ECtHR awards damages ('just satisfaction') for violation of rights contained in the ECHR. Regardless of the type of the violations, damages are the primary, go-to remedy used by the ECtHR. The Court insists that 'the awarding of sums of money to applicants by way of just satisfaction is not one of the Court's main duties but is incidental to its task of ensuring the observance by States of their obligations under the Convention'. 79 In this context, the Court 'does not provide a mechanism for compensation in a manner comparable to domestic court systems'. 80 Instead, the aim of awarding compensation is to 'provide reparation solely for damage suffered by those concerned to the extent that such events constitute a consequence of the violation that cannot otherwise be remedied'. 81 The aim of 'just satisfaction' is to compensate the victim for their 'loss', to address the wrong done to them and to correct the injustice. 82 In this context, the expectation is that the Court will adjust the amount of compensation 'to the concrete situation of each' victim 83 and to their personal circumstances. 84 But the current practice of the Court provides no clear principles as to when damages should be awarded and how they should be measured. Although the ECHR uses the term 'just satisfaction' to refer to monetary damages, it is unclear how the Court determines what is 'just'. Already in 2001, the Law Commission -the law reform body for England and Wales -criticized the approach of the Court as arbitrary and lacking in transparency. 85 Instead of adopting a clear approach, the amount of the award was determined on a case-by-case basis, 'often without considering or distinguishing cases involving similar facts'. 86 Practitioners and judges complain that to this day this lack of reasoned decisions articulating principles on which a remedy is afforded makes their work difficult. 87 It provides little opportunity for victims of rights violations for vindication of their interests or for governments that wish to redress such breaches.
It is in the context of this reliance on Article 41 and the lack of transparency about what is happening that claims about a shift in approach of the ECtHR have become more relevant. In a recent article, a current sitting judge of the Court, Pinto de Albuquerque, has argued that the Court 'uses punitive damages implicitly', and he has advocated that it 'should' do so even more frequently in the future in order to prevent repetition of wrongful conduct by states. 88 Since little is known about the Court's approach to damages, 89 Pinto de Albuquerque's argument that punitive damages are being implicitly used by the Court has to be taken seriously. Given the secrecy revolving around the Court's approach to Article 41, it is entirely possible that the Court has 'covertly' adopted a punitive, rather than a compensatory, approach to damages. Of course, the claim is of even greater relevance because it is made by a judge currently sitting in the Court, someone who has not only an insight into the work of the institution but also the power to influence its approach. 90 The argument in favour of punitive damages rather than non-monetary remedies appears appealing at first sight. Monetary remedies appear less onerous and less interventionist; they do not tell the state how to behave or what measures to adopt, 91 they merely say how much the breach will cost. In addition, empirical studies suggest that they are complied with more frequently, on average two or three times more often than other remedies. 92 But, although this holds for regular compensatory awards, it is unclear to what extent this is true of punitive damages: ' An award of punitive or exemplary damages makes the admonitory function of reparation more important and express than it would be if money judgments were limited to compensatory damages.'
93 When a judgment condemns wrongful conduct and accords remedies to the injured, this is 'assumed to discourage repetition of the act as well as to warn others who might be similarly inclined'. 94 In many circumstances, punitive damages 'contain elements of compensation as well as deterrence and punishment'.
95 Dinah Shelton, for example, cites cases in which the monetary damages awarded go beyond the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff (for example, a serious wrong that happens to cause small pecuniary loss) and would go under-deterred if damages were only measured at the level of a compensatory award. 91 Consistently with the black box theory that treats the state as a unity. 92 Hawkins and Jacoby, supra note 44, at 55ff. 93 Shelton, supra note 16. 94 Ibid., at 402. 95 Ibid., at 403.
The argument that punitive damages may be efficient in changing state behaviour stems from research undertaken in two areas: economic analysis of the law and behavioural economics. The first assumes that if states behave as rational actors, then they will pursue their goals rationally. This means that if external constraints are imposed on state behaviour, states will adjust accordingly. In this context, damages can act as an incentive for states not to engage in human rights violations: 'The threat of being held liable induces the state to incorporate the losses for the victims into their decisions on whether and how to engage in certain activities.' 96 The state effectively performs a cost-benefit analysis, deciding to cease its behaviour because to continue it would be too costly. Yet this line of reasoning requires that the damages imposed are high enough for the state to internalize the required behaviour.
However, the practice of attaching a 'price' to a human right violation can be problematic since it may have an unexpected, negative effect on violators. Behavioural economists who have shown that people have cognitive biases and only bounded willpower note that, when a 'fine' is attached to violations, rational actors may perceive this as a way of paying off their wrongdoing. 97 In principle, a fine should reduce infractions. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that a fine 'releases the actors from concerns about social disapproval' or 'social discomfort' that they may have felt in violating a norm. 98 In effect, a fine changes the actors' perception of the nature of the obligation. In a famous experiment, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini have shown that parents who are late to pick up their children from kindergarten feel guilty about their actions. 99 But when a fine is attached to their lateness, the guilt factor is removed, and parents are increasingly likely to be even more tardy in picking up their children. The introduction of the fine 'not only reduces the disapproval for being late but parents also no longer consider being late as blame-worthy'. Even more, 'the imposition of a price conveys the message that the commodity of "being late" could now be bought'. this regard, the process of assigning a price to rights leads states to being enabled of effectively paying for their wrongdoing. 102 In effect, therefore, a state may be 'willing to violate a social norm by purchasing the prerogative to do so'. 103 If damages are to act as an incentive to states to change their behaviour, they must take into account, therefore, both the rational and irrational aspects of state behaviour. While the economic analysis of law 'has traced the incentive effects of punitive damages on potential wrongdoers based on the assumption that they pursue their material advantage', behavioural economists focus on how actors react in practice. 104 In this context, for example, Theodore Eisenberg and Christoph Engel have shown that, depending on the amount of damages, actors may be deterred depending on the more uncertain the threat of the sanction and the higher its severity if they were sanctioned in the past. 105 It is not enough to impose high damages, expecting that states will undertake a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. Rather, both the uncertainty and the harshness of damages appear to be at play as well as the players' previous experiences. Behavioural economists also consider how norms are expressed. As Robert Cooter argues, punitive, rather than aggravated, damages are successful because they 'allow[] judges … to express righteous anger through speech and punishment. Expression of emotions by the court demonstrates the strength of its commitment to the law in question. Perception of this commitment shapes the expectations of citizens [for example, states] and changes their behaviour'. 106 The expressive power of adjudication, therefore, is also crucial. 107 In their judgments, courts provide clear signals to the violator state that they disapprove of its behaviour. While, in theory, it is argued that 'adjudicative expression can, by itself, influence the behaviour of existing disputants and of future potential disputants', 108 empirical experiments show that when a fine is framed retributively (as a punishment) and publicly it will act more as an effective deterrent. 109 When the damage amounts are interpreted as a 'punishment' or 'sanction', states are less likely to transgress the rules. Since punishment is expressed publicly, the additional publicity element adds a clear message to participants and to observers about what type of behaviour is undesired or immoral. The 'threat of a more publicly extracted fine might act as a more powerful incentive for cooperative behavior'.
If, as some judges at the ECtHR argue, damages should seek to incentivize states to change their behaviour and thus serve the purpose of deterrence, the question is whether the Court has already adopted this approach and whether Article 41 is currently being used as a potential deterrent: 'Whenever a purpose of a norm is stated, a need for a social analysis arises in order to verify whether the purpose will be fulfilled in reality.'
111 Joining together the lessons from the economic analysis of law and behavioural economists, there are three elements that a damage award would have to fulfil to have a deterrent effect: (i) high value; (ii) unpredictability and (iii) to be framed retributively. Building on empirical research, the next three sections address each in turn. They reveal not only that the current ECtHR practice is lacking in all three respects but also that the obstacles may prevent the adoption of punitive damages in the future.
An Economic and Behavioural Analysis of the ECtHR's Current Approach to Damages A Transparency, Elevated Value and Individualization
From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, damages may be seen as an instrument that can provide behavioural incentives to states to change their actions. The threat of being held liable induces actors (states) to incorporate potential losses into their decision-making and to reassess how often they should engage in such activity and what measures they should take to prevent such events in the future. Taking more care and putting measures into place to prevent violations can lower the probability of future violations and, thus, significantly reduce the actors' losses in the long term. Yet such cost-benefit analysis works only if the costs of paying off continuing, repetitive breaches are so high that they outweigh (at least in the long term) the costs of putting in place preventative measures. Damages should therefore 'be high enough to make taking due care [that is, putting in place preventative measures] … more attractive than applying a lower care level'. 112 In effect, the economic line of reasoning implies that damages should be high enough for the violator to consider seriously whether a different, non-violative behaviour would not be more cost-effective.
The ECtHR's approach to setting damages, especially non-pecuniary damages, takes a different approach. As the English courts have found, compensation at the ECtHR is 'ungenerous' in comparison to English tort standards, 113 and, in general, the amounts are exceedingly low and often merely 'symbolic'. 114 Even in the most serious cases, the awards tend to be modest -for example, €20,000 for torture and about €50,000 for the disappearance of a loved one.
115 Figure 2 contains all of the non-pecuniary awards made in the last 13 years for violations of Article 3 (torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 5 (arbitrary detention). 116 It clearly shows that the amounts of damages are low: 74.5 per cent of all Article 3 applicants are awarded compensation below €10,000, and 94.8 per cent of victims are awarded compensation below €20,000. For violation of Article 5, 80.7 per cent of victims receive below €5,000, and 94.8 per cent of victims receive below €10,000.
These considerably 'ungenerous' amounts are problematic from two perspectives. In the context of determining the appropriate amount, economists underline that a court needs to take into account the probability that a violator will be held liable. Victims of human rights violations face numerous obstacles before they get to the ECtHR. They have to exhaust all domestic remedies; if their case is declared admissible, they have to show that it was the state that committed the violation through active or passive behaviour, 117 after which they have to wait numerous years before their case is heard and before the judgment is rendered, all without certainty that their case will be successful.
118 Victims may find it too expensive to bring a suit and pursue the violator through the different stages of the process, especially when comparing the costs to the expected outcome of the process. They may thus suffer from what is known as 'rational apathy'. 119 At the same time, the violating state may choose to offer settlement money to the victim in order to prevent the case from coming to the Court or afterward, to prevent the final judgment from being rendered. All of these elements contribute to the fact that a finding of violation before any court, including the ECtHR, is uncertain. The violator takes this into account and may be willing to 'gamble' that due to any of these obstacles the finding of a violation is unlikely. High damages can ameliorate this situation. 121 They may provide 'an incentive to victims who have suffered severe dignitary harm' to pursue wrongdoers regardless of how difficult the path may be. 122 The more uncertain the outcome, the higher the damages have to be if the victim is to be sufficiently motivated and if potential wrongdoers are to be dissuaded from emulating wrongful conduct: 'The factor with which compensatory damages should be multiplied, is reciprocal of the probability of being held liable. ' 123 Therefore, if the probability of a finding of a violation is 50 per cent, then damages 'have to be doubled to provide the correct incentives'. 124 But the low-level awards made by the ECtHR do not take into account the tough route the applicant faces in getting to a violation. This allows states to be more willing to risk being taken to the Court, especially when there is a specific social benefit (or utility) to breaching the ECHR. The case of Ilgar Mammadov can serve as an example. An opposition politician in Azerbaijan, who was considered a likely candidate in the presidential elections of 2013, he was arrested, put on trial and sentenced in a move 'widely seen as politically motivated'. 125 Although the ECtHR had found a violation of Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention and awarded €20,000 in compensation, which was promptly paid, Mammadov remained in prison. The just satisfaction award, which, it should be noted was set at the very high end for Article 5 violations, 126 therefore had no deterrent effect, and the imprisonment of Mammadov clearly had greater utility to Azerbaijan than the damages awarded. Economists argue, therefore, that damages 'should be so high that they deter even the [violator] who [enjoys] these unaccepted benefits'. 127 The 'ungenerous' amounts awarded are also problematic from the perspective of how they assess the victim's suffering. A part of using damages as a deterrent also requires that the ECtHR properly estimates how much the victim has suffered: 'If there is a risk that compensatory damages fall short of the true losses of the victim, the [violator] does not receive adequate behavioural incentives.' 128 In order to motivate the violator to change their behaviour, therefore, the awards have to focus on the victim and the loss or harm suffered. Yet judges at the Court openly admit they struggle with assessing the suffering of victims, especially in the context of non-pecuniary damages. On numerous occasions, they 'acknowledge that it may generally be questionable whether human-rights violations can be cured by money' and that it is difficult or impossible 'to express in monetary terms the pain of having lost [a] son'. 129 In interviews, they acknowledge that they have no expertise in this respect and argue that they find it easier to assess the harm with reference to quantifiable elements (especially, the duration of a violation), which allows for comparisons between cases. 130 In this context, empirical results show that variables such as victims' assessment of loss, their particular circumstances or vulnerability and the distress suffered appear to not have a bearing on the final award. 131 Instead, statistical analysis has shown that it is the respondent state (and variables connected to it) that has a significant influence on the awards made by the Court. Damages appear to correlate better with the respondent state and its level of economic development. 132 The Court argues that by adjusting damages to the state, it is seeking to ensure that victims have equal purchasing power, but the almost exclusive focus on the state that is uncovered in empirical studies goes beyond that. 133 My results reveal that the state's previous infringement record also plays a role. In this context, under Article 5, preliminary analysis suggests that states pay between 10-20 Euros less per each additional case in which a violation of Article 5 has been found. 134 As other scholars have noted, in multiple applicant cases, compensation to each victim is lower than if they had appeared in a single-applicant claim. 135 These results would suggest that the more a state violates a certain right, the less it pays for that breach. When asked about this trend of award decreases, judges admit that the results may be due to their worries about compliance with which they grapple in their decision-making. 136 When states invoke an economic crisis as affecting their ability to pay, it is taken into account in the ECtHR's approach to cases. 137 Ukraine's claims about limited resources (due to a war it was fighting in the west) may have been taken into account in the imposition of lower awards made by the Court. 138 In a series of cases relating to the non-enforcement of the decisions of Ukrainian courts, the compensation for individuals waiting for enforcement was decreased from the initial €5,000 for non-pecuniary damage (in 1999) to €2,500 in the Ivanov pilot decision (in 2008) and then to €2,000 in Pysarskyy (in 2013). Although, initially, the Court drew careful distinctions between victims waiting for enforcement below and above three years (€1,500 and €3,000 respectively), the distinction was gradually removed, 139 and, since 2013, the applicants were paid €2,000 regardless of the amount of time they had waited for the enforcement of decisions, with some waiting longer than 10 years. 140 In addition, the awards that were initially made only for nonpecuniary damage were now intended to cover both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, regardless of the financial loss suffered by the applicant.
The story does not end there. In 2015, and in light of the thousands of outstanding cases before the ECtHR on the non-enforcement of decisions, the Court accepted that the Ukrainian government could avoid further claims by paying applicants only €1,000 for non-pecuniary damage, together with an undertaking to enforce the domestic judgments.
141 From 1999 to 2015, the 'price' for non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions had therefore fallen from €5,000 to 20 per cent of this amount. Even after Ukraine's promises to the victims to pay them the reduced amounts and enforce the outstanding judgments, applicants complained that their promises went unfulfilled. 142 In spite of reducing the financial burden on Ukraine, the original structural problem remained unaddressed.
Such judgments speak of the concern on the part of the ECtHR about the ability and willingness of the state to comply with its decisions. 143 But, from an economic analysis perspective, the approach of the Court is completely counter-intuitive since one would expect recalcitrant behaviour to get more and more expensive. Instead, the Court's approach makes violations cheaper and turns the cost-benefit analysis upside-down. Even more, from a behavioural economic viewpoint, it reinforces the idea that the award is a 'price' for recalcitrant behaviour and provides little or no encouragement for states to change their behaviour. States pay for the delay but then continue their actions without making any changes. The 29,000 Ivanov-type cases that the Court has received between 1999 and 2017 reveal how the remedies adopted by the Court have failed to incentivize Ukraine to change its behaviour. In fact, by overwhelming the Court with cases generated by unaddressed structural problems, Ukraine appears to have managed to get a 'discount on quantity' for its behaviour. This decision to adjust or effectively lower damages to facilitate states' compliance has had no deterrent effect and, instead, seems to have led to the potential collapse of the system. In 2017, in Burmych v. Ukraine, when the issue of Ivanov-type cases arose again before the Court, the Grand Chamber effectively gave up on trying to incentivize Ukraine to comply with its judgments. The Court dismissed all of its remaining 12,148 Ivanovtype cases as well as any future cases 144 and forwarded them to the Department of Execution at the Council of Europe. The Court's argument was that it had done everything it could, and now it was up to the Department of Execution to find a solution for the implementation of its judgments.
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The first requirement of damages as a deterrent requires awards to be individualized, so that the victim's loss and suffering is recognized and that the low probability of being successful before the Court is acknowledged. Yet the ECtHR does not focus on the victim but, rather, on the state and its capacity to comply with the decision. As the dissenters in Burmych put it, the majority's decision to join all 12,148 applications without 'assess[ing] each of the cases individually' contradicts the idea of the Convention system as one of 'individual justice'. 146 According to the ECHR, each victim has the right to have their case decided after an individual judicial consideration of their single application and a thorough examination of their case file. Yet the Court circumvents this fact. Although the approach of the Court in Burmych appears counter-intuitive from the perspective of an economic analysis of the law, the reduction of fines from case to case is perhaps not in itself surprising. Psychologists show that our reactions to large number of cases (for example, large losses of human life, largescale atrocities or violations) are different than when we are dealing with a single case. Susskind and colleagues find that 'a single individual, unlike a group, is viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more extensive processing of information 144 Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, supra note 74, para 6, Dissenting Opinions of Judges Yudkivska, Sajó, Bianku, Karakas, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Motoc on pro futuro aspect of the judgment. 145 This conclusion was challenged by very strong dissents. The approach adopted by the Court was in danger of 'transferring the determination of human rights claims from a judicial authority, as the Convention system requires, to a political body, albeit a collective one, namely the Committee of Ministers'. But more than this, it was accused of giving the violator Governments the power 'to seize control of thousands of cases brought against them before the Court and the entire philosophy of the and stronger impressions about individuals than about groups'. 147 People feel more distress and compassion when 'considering an identified single victim than when considering a group of victims'. 148 There is a novelty and immediacy with one single victim. 149 When 'a violation becomes a statistic (as it necessarily does when you are dealing with 29,000 similar cases on non-enforcement of domestic judgments), this leads to psychological numbing: '[R]epetition eventually numbs the moral imagination.'
150 Charities receive fewer donations for two starving children than they do for one and even less when the problem is introduced in statistical terms. 151 People are less willing to help unidentified statistical victims than identified individuals. 152 In essence, the bigger the numbers, the more our view of, and consideration for, each individual victim is blurred. 153 When people in the cases dealt with by the Court become unidentified statistical victims, then this 'leads to apathy and inaction'. 154 The first problem of the Court's approach is therefore uncovered.
B Predictability of the Amount of Damages
Behavioural economists have found that unpredictable damages have a better deterrent effect than fully predicable (or certain) damages. Looking at the issue both from a criminal law (in relation to sentencing) and tort law perspective (in relation to damages), these economists have experimented with the uncertainty and certainty of sanctions and showed that a lack of predictability adds to the efficiency of the legal norms. lthough Mr Navalnyy's rights were violated in the context of seven different arrests, he was awarded just twice the amount of compensation awarded to an applicant whose rights were violated on only one occasion, as shown by the example of the Frumkin case. In effect, each of Mr Navalnyy's arrests was compensated for by less than a third of the amount by way of just satisfaction that Mr Frumkin received for the violations of his rights suffered in conjunction with his arrest. While the awards made under Article 41 depend on a number of factors, and no two cases are identical in this or other regards, this is a glaring difference that accordingly demands an explanation. The question here, then, is whether it is justified to reduce the amount of compensation awarded to Mr Navalnyy for the individual violations of his rights in the light of the fact that they occurred on multiple occasions.' ECtHR, Navalnyy v. Russia certainty what their sanction will be (or how much they will be charged for a specific breach), the deterrence effect of the primary norm was reduced. 155 Over the course of the experiment, the value of the sanction was varied, and the participants had to decide at each point whether to breach the norm or obey it. The authors found that the greater the uncertainty regarding the size of the fine, the more unlikely the participants were to breach the norm and thus trigger the sanction. The conclusions drawn from this experiment were that, at least in the context of tort law, 156 such results suggest that reform efforts aimed at making non-economic and punitive damages more predictable may decrease the deterrent effect of the law. Baker, Harel and Kugler's article, which was written at a time when tort reform was being discussed in the USA, ended up rejecting the proposals that one should impose an upper limit on tort damages and thus make damages more certain. Reduction in uncertainty resulting from such reform could 'well magnify the expected loss in deterrence'. 157 The conclusion was therefore that a lack of predictability seems to be a key ingredient of an efficient remedy network.
The current practice of the ECtHR in relation to the imposition of damages is secret. There appear to be no clear principles as to when damages should be awarded and how they should be measured. Yet, in determining the quantum of non-pecuniary damages, the ECtHR has established a set of internal 'scales on equitable principles … in order to arrive at equivalent results in similar cases'. 158 These were developed 'after years of examining' the reasons for the delays attributable to the parties under the Italian procedural rules, leading to the violation of Article 6 on the length of proceedings. The scales exist mostly for 'repetitive' or 'clone' cases or, indeed, for 'pilot judgments' and remain unpublished. 159 Some authors argue that this lack of transparency is due to the Court being concerned about creating more litigation, but the judges themselves admit that the lack of clarity preserves their discretion in the context of Article 41.
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At first sight, therefore, damages before the ECtHR appear to be uncertain. Yet the data of the empirical analysis reveal a completely different picture. Figure 2 shows clearly that there is very little variation in amounts. In total, 74.5 per cent of all Article 3 applicants are awarded compensation below €10,000, and, in 94.8 per cent of victims, the amount is below €20,000. With respect to Article 5 applicants, 80.7 per cent of victims receive below €5,000, and 94.8 per cent receive below €10,000. The consistency of the Court's approach is such that, out of 1,128 applicants whose Article 3 rights were found to have been violated in the last 13 years, only one stands out as a clear outlier: a case of multiple occasions of torture, which exceptionally brought the victim €105,000. Even if the Court enjoys discretion when it comes to the award of damages, it seems that it is choosing to exercise it in a consistent, predictable manner.
In fact, judges acknowledge that those states who appear frequently before the ECtHR (for example, systemic violations) may have seen the tables and might even know precisely the spectrum within which the Court is almost certainly going to set the damage amounts. 161 Those who have worked at the Court speak about the need for transparency and standardization -an objective basis on which the calculation of damages takes place. 162 Yet, in the absence of a general overview of the case law and an internal statistical analysis, they fail to see how intuitive the damage amounts are. In fact, the approach of the Court to calculating damages is so consistent that judges take into account years or days of imprisonment (for example, under Article 5) rather than consider whether an individual was especially vulnerable. 163 This need to resort to only objective, quantifiable factors in determining damages means that, more often than not, the frequent violators are well aware of the 'price' their violation will trigger, even if the precise manner in which the amount will be calculated remains unknown. 164 What states know about the amount of damages as well as their previous experience before the ECtHR are important because it is not the theoretical threat of damages but, rather, states' actual (prior) individual experience with sanctioning that affects their future behaviour. 165 Since the current approach of the Court provides for low and predictable damage amounts, states are able to plan the cost of their violations. An intriguing example of such behaviour is Russia, which is one of the worst systemic violators of the ECHR (together with Turkey, Romania and Ukraine). Russian legislation explicitly requires that the country's annual budget contains a part intended to pay off ECHR violations. 166 Between 2010 and 2016, the amount 'reserved' for ECHR compensation increased from 114 million rubles (US $1.7 million) to 500 million rubles (US $7.6 million). 167 At the same time, however, little has been achieved to address the source or underlying causes of these violations (especially the conduct of domestic authorities in the context of Articles 2 and 3). Although budgeting for ECHR compensation does not necessarily mean that Russia 'plans' its violations in advance, this clearly indicates some sort of calculation as to how much ECtHR violations will cost in a given year. Russia may be aware of the cases that are coming through the pipeline of the Court, yet rather than invest money into addressing systemic problems and breaches (or providing alternative remedies at home, as Italy does), Russia instead puts money towards compensating human rights violations. 168 Therefore, it seems that the predictability of the ECtHR's damages appears to allow frequent violators to plan the cost of their violations while doing little to address the underlying problems in their legal system.
The Court asserts that its awards seek to work as 'a serious and effective means of dissuasion', especially in relation to systemic and repetitive violators. 169 Yet the Russian example clearly indicates that the current approach of the Court may be allowing (or enabling) states to think of compensation as a 'price' to be paid for a violation, while, at the same time, failing to act as an incentive for states to change their behaviour. The current operation of damages under the ECHR therefore appears to have no deterrent impact on the behaviour of states.
C Retribution and Publicity as an Essential Element of Punitive Damages
The third element that is necessary for damages to have a deterrent effect is that they be framed retributively and publicly. In this context, experiments have shown that if the financial amount is presented as a punishment, the threat of such retributive sanction is likely to produce the desired effect on behaviour. 170 In contrast, when the amounts are interpreted as performing a compensatory function (that is, when they are labelled as compensation for loss or harm), these are likely to be seen as an opportunity to compensate the victims of violative behaviour and have been shown to be ineffectual deterrents. It is the expressive function of labelling a fine as a 'punishment' or 'sanction' that means that individuals are less likely to transgress the rules. In experiments conducted, individuals were less likely to be late when a 'punishment' was attached to their behaviour.
Studies have also found greater behavioural effect of fines when these were extracted publicly (or threatened to be extracted publicly). 171 The publicity element contains a clear message to participants and to observers about what type of behaviour is undesired or immoral. In experiments, when punishment was threatened to be imposed publicly, individuals showed up considerably earlier for the meeting than was found to 168 As was done by Italy in relation to the length of proceedings, the Pinto legislation allowed for compensation to be awarded at home, rather than turning to the ECHR. be the case in control groups. Thus, 'it would appear that the threat of a more publicly extracted fine might act as a more powerful incentive for cooperative behavior'. 172 It is the cumulative effect of both variables -framing the fine retributively and extracting/ imposing it publicly -that has the most efficient impact on participants. 173 Therefore, in addition to the high value and unpredictability of damage amounts, it is crucial that the fine is framed as a sanction and that it is administered publicly.
The ECtHR explicitly rejects the position that the damages are (or should be) punitive. The Practice Directions of March 2007 and January 2016 state that: the purpose of the Court's award in respect of damage is to compensate the applicant for the actual harmful consequences of a violation. It is not intended to punish the Contracting Party responsible. The Court has therefore, until now, considered it inappropriate to accept claims for damages with labels such as 'punitive', 'aggravated' or 'exemplary'. 174 The Practice Directions therefore clearly state that the Court has 'until now' not deviated from general international law, where punitive damages have been explicitly rejected. 175 In case after case, the Court has consistently and explicitly refused claimants' requests for exemplary, aggravated or punitive damages, 176 including when such requests were specifically made to 'reflect the particular character of the violations suffered by [applicants] and to serve as a deterrent in respect of violations of a similar nature by the respondent State'. 177 In Varnava and Others v. Turkey, the Court held that '[i]t considers there to be little, if any, scope under the Convention for directing governments to pay penalties to applicants which are unconnected with damage shown to be actually incurred in respect of past violations of the Convention'. 178 In spite of this clear and consistent rejection of punitive damages, there are increasing voices both in academia and in judicial circles that argue that the ECtHR -as a lex specialis system 179 -allows for the imposition of such damages since it primarily does not function as an interstate dispute resolution mechanism. 180 The focus on individual claims, it is argued, allows the Court to depart from traditional international law and shift its approach to adopt punitive damages, especially in cases of gross violations of human rights; prolonged, deliberate non-compliance with a judgment of the Court and severe curtailment of the applicant's human rights, particularly, those restricting his or her access to the Court. 181 In this context, some insist that a shift has already occurred and that the Court 'has already changed its course and uses punitive damages, albeit rather implicitly'. 182 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (together with van Aaken), for example, argues that the Practice Directions 'is no longer up to date'. 183 He goes further and maps out seven ways in which the Court has implicitly applied punitive damages. 184 Similarly, Shelton argues that 'there seems to be some shift towards considering exemplary and aggravated damages, if not punitive measures'. 185 She relies on the same arguments as provided by Pinto de Albuquerque, as well as separate opinions made by other judges, in which they expressly refer to awards in certain cases as punitive. 186 The proposition is therefore that the Court has allowed aggravated, exemplary or even punitive damages. In the next sections, I investigate two examples that are often cited in which it is argued that such damages have been imposed implicitly.
Cases with No Reported Loss
The first situation concerns cases in which applicants make no claim for compensation. In its Practice Directions, the ECtHR makes it explicit that the applicant 'must make a specific claim' for just satisfaction. If the applicant fails to comply with the requirement and makes no claim, the 'Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account'. 187 This approach is consistent with the '[t]he inherent purpose' of compensation to 'place the injured party in the position in which he or she would have been had the violation found not taken place'. Under the compensatory model, when the injured party 'does not even claim to have sustained any damage', then the Court should award no damages. 188 As a matter of principle ('ne ultra petitum rule'), therefore, victims that claim no compensation will receive no damages. 189 In the words of the IACtHR, 'reparations should not make the victims or their successors either richer or poorer'. 190 Yet, as scholars note, the ECtHR has awarded compensation in certain cases in which the applicant has not asked for compensation or in which they have failed to submit the claim within the required time limits. 191 The most recent of these cases was Nagmetov, in which the applicant's son had been killed by police using firearms during a protest. 192 The Court found a double violation of Article 2 of the ECHR. In particular, the Court ruled that, in addition to the substantive breach of Article 2 (unlawful and excessive use of lethal force), there were numerous shortcomings in the investigation and that Russia had not provided any compensation for the killing over the nine years that had passed after the events. The applicant, however, made no request under Article 41 in the prescribed time limit, and the question arose whether the Court could award the applicant any damages. Relying on previous cases in which 'the Court had exceptionally found it equitable to award compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, even where no such claim had been made', the Chamber decided to make an award. 193 The case then travelled to the Grand Chamber, so that it could clarify the practice of the Court, given that different sections of the Court had adopted different approaches in these cases. 194 The Grand Chamber asserted that the Court's guiding principle was equity but that it also enjoyed 'a degree of flexibility' with respect to non-pecuniary damage. Put together, these principles required it to provide 'an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable', including not only the position of the applicant but also the overall context in which the breach occurred. This meant that judges could exercise discretion in exceptional circumstances, where the gravity of the breach and its impact on the applicant were such that an adequate reparation was unavailable or restitution in integrum was impossible. Since these elements were fulfilled in Nagmetov, it was thus appropriate for an award to be made. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in his concurring opinion labels these awards as punitive. The reasons for this are, Pinto de Albuquerque argues, that the exact number of individual victims of human rights violations was not established and, in fact, that the victims in the Karpas region were neither identified nor identifiable on the basis of the evidence in the file. The ECtHR did not establish any criteria for the distribution of the compensation among the victims or their lawful heirs and did not provide any rules about the devolution of compensation in cases where victims and their lawful heirs cannot be found. As Pinto de Albuquerque puts it, 'in this eventuality, the claimant State will be the final beneficiary of the amounts paid by the respondent State. The punitive nature of this compensation is flagrant '. 209 This statement might seem like a condemnation, but Pinto de Albuquerque welcomes: punitive damages [as] an appropriate and necessary instrument for fulfilling the Court's mission to uphold human rights in Europe and ensuring the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols. ... This conclusion applies with even greater force in the case at hand, where the respondent State not only committed a multitude of gross human rights violations over a significant period of time in northern Cyprus, and did not investigate the most significant of these violations adequately and in a timely manner, but also deliberately failed year after year to comply with the Grand Chamber's judgment on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these specific violations. 210 In comparison to Nagmetov, the award in Cyprus v. Turkey is clearly unpredictable, and the overall amount of the non-pecuniary compensation is high (due to the uncertain, but clearly large, number of victims). However, as with Nagmetov, the majority opinion of the Court is at pains to underline that it in no way departs from previous case law. In this regard, the Court emphasizes that, according to the very nature of the ECHR, it is the individual, and not the State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and primarily 'injured' by a violation of one or several Convention rights. Therefore, if just satisfaction is afforded in an interstate case, it should always be done for the benefit of the individual victims. Citing the International Court of Justice's decision in Diallo, the Court finds that the sum awarded to the applicant state in the exercise of diplomatic protection of its citizens is intended to provide reparation for the latter's injury. 211 Just satisfaction is awarded, the Court argues, to two sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable groups of people -that is, 1,456 missing persons and the enclaved Greek-Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula. The damages are not sought 'with a view to compensating the State for a violation of its rights but for the benefit of individual victims'. 212 In this regard, the receiving state is under an obligation to 'transfer to the injured person any compensation obtained for the injury from the responsible State'. 213 It is clear from these statements that the ECtHR is trying to go no further than general international law allows. The damages, which are referred to again as compensation, are intended for the individual and not for the state. Yet the Court's insistence on 'compensation' may also be strategic. By insisting on the compensatory nature of the award, the Court is counting on the fact that 'it is often difficult to draw a line between damages designed to punish the wrongdoing state and purely compensatory damages taking into account the state's degree of misconduct'. 214 If compensatory nature of the damages is maintained, then perhaps the state is more likely to comply. In this respect, the Court is perhaps aware of the studies that show that, in contrast to controlled experiments on individuals, which speak in favour of retributive framing, damages in certain legal orders that are openly labelled as 'punitive' often go unenforced. Arbitral punitive damages, for example, are 'generally not enforceable in jurisdictions that do not recognize this remedy'. 215 Niccolo Castagno observes that in countries like Italy and Germany 'the public policy defence … could … represent a strong bias against the enforcement of punitive damages awards'. 216 He takes the same view for the UK, considering that under English law such relief is not available in contract cases. 217 Beyond arbitral awards, similar trends have been noted even in domestic legal orders, which allow for such damages (like the USA). Although, in those jurisdictions, the enforcement of punitive damages may not be an issue, the practice shows that the awards are often reduced on appeal. 218 pursued. 219 In the context of international law, which relies heavily on states' willingness to comply voluntarily with judicial decisions, judgments have to persuade states to accept and enforce the ultimate award. If states perceive damages as openly retributive, they may treat them as inappropriate and excessive and may withhold compliance as a consequence. In proceedings before the Court, Turkey, for example, explicitly argued against the use of punitive damages, reminding the Court that the ECHR does not guarantee a right to punitive damages and that the case law has consistently rejected them. 220 It insisted that no money should be paid for the unidentified beneficiaries. Since the decision was rendered in 2014, Turkey has consistently avoided calls to provide any response to the decision or information regarding when the payment would take place. At each of its meetings since June 2015, the Committee of Ministers has recalled that the obligation to pay the just satisfaction awarded by the Court is unconditional, and it has called upon the Turkish authorities to pay the sums awarded in the judgment. Yet Turkey's silence continues even in the face of the expired time limit (18 months), after which the default interest of 6 per cent started to accumulate. Compliance with the just satisfaction decision seems less and less likely.
Yet it is striking that since the 2014 decision was rendered Turkey has in fact begun addressing the violations from the 2001 judgment. Within a few months of the 2014 decision, it started putting in place a domestic scheme for restitution, exchange or compensation for those deprived of property; it has also begun to provide access for experts to military zones so that the excavations of those missing can be started as well as to archives to determine the location of remains and so on. 221 The judgment therefore appears to have nudged the state to begin to address the underlying issues. In this regard, perhaps Pinto de Albuquerque's decision to openly call the award 'punitive' (and/or the surprisingly high level of the award) may have helped nudge the state into action. It is possible that the €30-60 million payments will never be made, 222 but the judgment was not without impact. If the aim of using punitive damages (implicitly or explicitly) is to trigger different behaviour from the state, then perhaps Cyprus v. Turkey is a good beginning.
Conclusion
In this article, I show how the choice of remedy affects compliance and why aggravated or punitive damages look like an ideal option to nudge states into compliance. I explore recent arguments by scholars and judges who argue that the ECtHR should actively shift its approach (or perhaps already has) to nudge state behaviour towards compliance and the prevention of future violations. However, based on my empirical research, I show that the current case law presents several obstacles to the 219 introduction of punitive damages. Building on the economic analysis of the law and insights from behavioural sciences, I show how the Court's approach fails to comply with any of the elements needed to incentivize states to change their behaviour, specifically the high value of awards, predictability and retributive framing. If damages should seek to incentivize states to change their behaviour and thus serve the purpose of deterrence, it is quite clear from the practice of the Court that judges on the bench have actively avoided using damages for this purpose.
Only in one decision -Cyprus v. Turkey -are the awards sufficiently high and unpredictable, as well as having been openly called out as punitive, to fulfil the criteria of punitive damages. It is this decision that offers some indication of the implications of a potential shift in the remedy structure. Although the Court appears to be clearly resistant to the idea of punishing states through monetary fines, Cyprus v. Turkey appears to suggest that unpredictable high-value judgments may nudge states to begin to redress the underlying violation. Although, in a system that relies on voluntary compliance, such damages are unlikely to be paid out, they may nevertheless encourage states to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and conclude that it is best to get rid of structural/systemic problems than to continue the violation.
Cyprus v. Turkey is of course an outlier and cannot persuasively and on its own reaffirm the idea of unpredictable, high-value punitive damages, especially in light of such consistent case law to the contrary. Yet the example shows that insights from behavioural economists could perhaps be applied even in a state context and could be used to inform our thinking about the reform of the current remedy structure. Although states are not individuals and may not behave like individuals when it comes to money (for example, when damages are called 'punitive', states are perhaps less likely to pay them), they may nevertheless react to a decision imposing such awards. And this reaction is often more than is triggered by the existing monetary and non-monetary remedies.
